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Proper functionality is a necessity for systems used in safety-critical applications;
consequently, software in these systems is often subject to rigorous validation and for-
mal verification that aims at ensuring expected behavior. To aid in the design of these
systems, several synchronous programming languages exist for describing determin-
istic system models suitable for formal verification and validation. Examples of such
synchronous languages include SIGNAL, Lustre, MRICDF, and Esterel. Common
application domains for synchronous programs include avionics, automotive control,
process control, and defense systems. In many cases, rigorous formal verification of
these systems is unfeasible because the methods, such as theorem proving and model
checking, are too expensive. A theorem proving approach requires a great deal of
user involvement and expertise, and a model checking approach may not be feasible
on systems of substantial complexity due to computation constraints. This thesis
presents the design, implementation, and evaluation of SAGA, a prototype tool for
the automated validation of synchronous reactive embedded systems. SAGA shifts
the testing effort associated with critical systems from creating individual test cases
manually to reasoning about the safety and environment properties of a system. The
approach SAGA takes is to generate relevant inputs to the system-under-test from a
user-specified environment description, and to validate the resulting system behavior
against user-specified safety properties. This overview of SAGA includes a thorough
iii
user’s guide and important implementation details. Additionally, the validation pro-
cess with SAGA is qualitatively assessed. The assessment is done through a case
study involving the celebrated steam boiler control specification problem. Results
from this case study reveal the utility of SAGA in exposing non-trivial system errors.
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1.1 Problem Statement and Motivation
Proper functionality is a must for systems used in safety-critical applications;
consequently, software in these systems is subject to rigorous validation and formal
verification that aims at ensuring expected behavior [21, 1, 16]. The rise in autonomy
in modern-day embedded systems has been accompanied by a rise in software com-
plexity, which has made the verification and validation of these systems an increasing
challenge [24, 19]. The failure of such systems, particularly in safety-critical appli-
cations, can result in serious injury, loss of life, environmental damage, or negative
economic repercussions [15, 9]. According to the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, in 2002 the cost to the US economy due to software errors was estimated
to be $59.5 billion [27].
The problems associated with current-day verification and validation (V&V) meth-
ods also concern national security. In Technical Horizons, a report establishing the
vision for U.S. Air Force key science and technology focus areas for 2010-2030, V&V
is highlighted as a main research focus area [24]. The relative ease with which modern
autonomous systems can be developed poses an advantage to adversaries who may
choose to field such systems without the burden of ensuring them trustworthy [24].
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In many cases, rigorous formal verification is unfeasible because the methods,
such as theorem proving and model checking, are costly [23, 10]. The type of costs
associated with each method varies based on the type of formal verification being
performed. A theorem proving approach requires a great deal of user involvement
and expertise [10]. A model checking approach may not be feasible on systems of
substantial complexity due to computation constraints [10]. Figure 1.1 illustrates the
state space explosion problem associated with model checking. The approach taken
in model checking is to conduct an exhaustive exploration of the program state space;
therefore when given an automaton A with M number of states and n Boolean inputs,
the state space S of A that must be explored grows exponentially as the number of
inputs n increases as follows: S(A) = M ∗ 2n.
Figure 1.1: Exponential Growth of Automaton State Space
1.2 Contribution
The primary contribution of this thesis is SAGA, the SIGNAL Auto-Generated
Assayer. SAGA is a prototype tool designed and implemented for the automated
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validation of synchronous reactive embedded systems. It provides a framework which
shifts the testing effort associated with critical systems from manually creating indi-
vidual test cases to reasoning about the safety and environment properties of a system.
The purpose behind the development of SAGA is to provide a means towards increas-
ing the effectiveness and lessening the effort associated with the validation process of
modern-day embedded systems.
The operation of SAGA is fully defined in this thesis. A detailed overview describes
the validation process in SAGA, from system environment simulation to checking
system safety properties. A thorough guide to using SAGA is also included. In the
guide, a cruise control system is used to illustrate a complete working example.
Finally, a qualitative assessment of SAGA is done through a case study. The case
study consists of the application of SAGA to the celebrated steam boiler controller
specification problem. For the purpose of this case study, an implementation of the
steam boiler controller was developed using the SIGNAL language. Using safety prop-
erties derived directly from the specification, the system is validated in two scenarios:
(i) a realistic runtime environment, where the typical operation of the system can
be inspected and (ii) a stress scenario in which threshold values are exceeded and
boundary operating cases are observed.
1.3 Related Work
The motivating purpose behind the development of synchronous languages has
been to provide a suitable means for correctly implementing safety-critical systems,
hence their formal verification and validation has been a research subject of great
attention. Of these languages, Lustre has received the most interest from industry
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and academia due to its successful commercialization [4]. Many of the automatic
testing tools developed for reactive systems are therefore for Lustre programs. Some
of these tools include Lutess, Lurette, and GATeL [4].
An overarching theme in automated validation is the use of synchronous ob-
servers as established in [18]. This approach lends itself adequate for synchronous
programs since communication among synchronous processes is an ordered procedure
that avoids the problem of non-determinism in the interleaving of asynchronous pro-
cesses. Many of the tools for Lustre take a monoformalistic approach, where the test
generator is specified using the same language as the system programming language.
One such approach is done in [17]. Test generation in [17] is done by specifying a
set of Lustre invariants which impose constraints on the possible input vectors that
a random generator may produce, and analyzing the runtime behavior with safety
properties (also specified in Lustre). This approach has the obvious advantage that a
user won’t need to learn an additional specification language, but may in turn limit
the overall capabilities of a tool.
Both Lutess and Lurette use synchronous observers and a monoformalistic test
specification with language extensions. The testing methods they adopt are random,
property-guided, operational profiled-based, and pattern-based testing [4, 25]. The
tool GATeL takes a different approach. Given a specified property, GATeL provides a
sequence of input vectors which will arrive the program from an initial configuration
to a state which will test the property. GATeL therefore requires the full specifica-
tion of the system-under-test in order to find such a sequence of input vectors [4].
Currently, Sigali is the only verification tool available for SIGNAL programs, and
is included in the Polychrony Toolset. Sigali, however, does not include automatic
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testing capabilities [7]. No other tools for SIGNAL currently exist in the domain of
this work.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The work presented in this Thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 gives an introduction to the synchronous languages and the syn-
chronous approach to validation. A brief overview of the SIGNAL language is
given and a cruise control system is presented as an example SIGNAL program.
• Chapter 3 provides an overview of SAGA and defines its approach to environ-
ment simulation and safety validation.
• Chapter 4 serves as a guide for using SAGA by providing a definition of its
syntax and required file formats. A complete example of a validation session on
the cruise control system is included.
• Chapter 5 presents a case study on the celebrated steam boiler controller spec-
ification problem as a qualitative assessment of SAGA.





2.1 Synchronous Programming Languages
The synchronous programming languages provide a favorable approach to describ-
ing reactive embedded systems [13, 11, 5]. A reactive system is one that interacts
with its environment by producing a response to every event. In particular, the sys-
tem must properly respond to the environment before a second event acts upon it;
therefore, reactive systems are typically subject to strict timing constraints, and re-
quire concurrent determinism [22, 13]. The synchronous languages provide means for
ensuring concurrent determinism and abstracting timing requirements from the soft-
ware specification of a system [13, 5]. The synchronous deterministic system models
are suitable for formal verification and validation, and are therefore commonly used
in specifying safety-critical applications [5, 8]. Some synchronous programming lan-
guages include Esterel, SIGNAL, Lustre, Argos, and MRICDF [13, 8]. Common appli-
cation domains for synchronous programs include signal processing systems, avionics,
automotive control, nuclear power control, and defense systems [28, 26].
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2.1.1 Synchronous Hypothesis
Synchronous languages vary in programming style, but are all based on the same
computation model. This computation model is founded on the synchronous hypoth-
esis. The synchronous hypothesis states that computation and communications are
instantaneous from the point of view of logical time [5, 12]. Figure 2.1 illustrates the
concept of synchronous computation.
Figure 2.1: Synchronous Software Operation
The synchronous model is fundamentally a time abstraction that assumes the
hardware timing constraints are met by the system [11]. A step in execution denotes
a logical instant in time. Each step in a synchronous system is an ordered sequence
consisting of the reception of inputs, the internal program computation, and the




The synchronous paradigm is suitable for automated validation due its inherent
determinism. An overarching theme in automated validation of synchronous programs
is the use of synchronous observers as established in [18]. By observer, it is meant a
second program that monitors the runtime behavior of the program under test [14].
This approach is adequate for synchronous programs since communication among
synchronous processes is a strict sequence of atomic steps that avoids the problem of
non-determinism in the interleaving of asynchronous processes [14].
More specifically with reactive systems, the synchronous observers are an envi-
ronment property observer and a safety property observer that work in conjunction
with a test generator. The purpose of an environment observer is to ensure that
only relevant test cases are produced by the test case generator. In practice, this is
typically implemented by specifying environment test profiles. Given a sequence of
test cases, the purpose of a safety observer is to ensure the system behavior meets
specified safety properties; therefore, rather than explicitly providing a test suite, a
collection of invariant safety properties must be specified.
2.2 SIGNAL
SIGNAL is a polychronous (i.e. synchronous, multi-clock) dataflow specification
language. Polychronous components allow multiple clock rates, and are therefore
suitable for describing distributed systems [13, 12]. In a dataflow description of a
program, each concurrent statement can effectively have a different clock by having
dependencies on different signals. This concept is often found in hardware description
languages, where a statement is updated only when an event, such as a rising-edge,
8
Construct Type Syntax
Parallel Composition (| P | Q |)
Restriction P where x
Assignment y := x
y := F(x1,x2,...,xn)
Delay Assignment y := x $ init c
Sampling Assignment y := x when z
Merging Assignment y := x default z
Table 2.1: Assignment Statements in SIGNAL
occurs on one of its signals. At each step in the execution of a SIGNAL program,
each signal can be either present or absent [11].
SIGNAL was developed in Rennes, France at the Research Institute in Computer
Science and Random Systems (IRISA) [11]. A SIGNAL compiler is included in the
Polychrony toolset which is freely distributed by the ESPRESSO team at IRISA [28].
A commercial implementation of Polychrony, called RT-Builder, is supplied by the
company GeenSoft for industrial scale projects [20, 11].
2.2.1 Primitive Language Constructs
The SIGNAL primitive language constructs are briefly introduced here, and an
example of the SIGNAL specification for a cruise control system is provided in the fol-
lowing section. For a complete guide to the SIGNAL language, the reader is referred
to [6]. The primitive language constructs of SIGNAL are summarized in Table 2.1.
The individual statements that make up a program in SIGNAL are added through
parallel composition. The parallel composition of P and Q means that both state-
ments execute concurrently. In a SIGNAL program, a subprocess declaration is done
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by using a restriction statement. The restriction statement declares x as being con-
tained in P .
A concurrent assignment statement will assign the current step value of the signal
x to the signal y. A delay assignment is much like a concurrent assignment, but with
the inclusion of a delay operation. The delay operator “ $ ” is used to assign the
previous-step value of x to y. The sampling assignment can be used to assign a value
to y when a given signal x is present and true or an expression is logically true. A
merge assignment can be used to assign the value of x to y when x is present, or the
value of z to y when x is absent and z is present.
2.2.2 Example: A Cruise Control System
A cruise control system is incrementally introduced in this section to provide an
example of a SIGNAL program. The full program listing is provided in Appendix
A. The cruise control system is further used in chapter 4 as the system-under-test
for an example of a validation session in SAGA. For sake of clarity, this example
provides a simple abstraction of an actual cruise control. The system is simplified
by using the output signals throttle and brake as Boolean assertions to control the
vehicle speed differential. Furthermore, the system is restricted to a single-clocked
specification, where all signals share the same clock. A diagram of the cruise control
system is presented in Figure 2.2.
The diagram illustrates the system inputs and outputs which constitute the cruise
control interface. Listing 2.1 shows the corresponding interface specification in SIG-
NAL. These statements are the preamble to the body description of the system. The
10
Figure 2.2: Cruise Control System Diagram
set input is used to activate cruise control, and the cancel input is used to deac-
tivate cruise control. The speed inc and speed dec inputs are used to increment
and decrement, respectively, the cruise control speed. The input speed is an integer
value provided to the cruise control system which represents the current reading from
a speed sensor in the vehicle. The outputs throttle and brake are used by the
cruise control system to increase or decrease, respectively, the speed of the vehicle.
Finally, the ctrl on disp output is used to indicate whether cruise control is active
or inactive.
1 process cruiseControl =
2 ( % inputs %
3 ? integer speed; % speed sensor %
4 boolean set , % turn ON cruise control %
5 cancel , % turn OFF cruise control %
6 speed_inc , % increase cruise speed %
7 speed_dec; % decrease cruise speed %
8 % outputs %
9 ! boolean throttle , % throttle control %
10 brake , % brake control %
11 ctrl_on_disp; % control indicator %
12 )
Listing 2.1: Cruise Control: Input and Output Interface
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The internal variables control on and cruise speed are declared in Listing 2.2.
The control on variable is used to store the current status of the system. A value of
true for control on indicates the cruise control system is active. The cruise speed
variable is used to store the speed at which the cruise control system must maintain
the vehicle.
1 where % local variables %
2 boolean control_on; % cruise control state %
3 integer cruise_speed; % cruise control speed %
4 end % cruiseControl %
Listing 2.2: Cruise Control: Internal Variables
The body of the program is presented in Listing 2.3. It is important to keep
in mind that assignment statements are executed concurrently within a step. The
statement in line 1 assigns a value to the internal variable control on of true when
set is true, else false when cancel is true; otherwise, it maintains its previous-step
value control on$. The output signal ctrl on disp in line 5 reflects the value of
the internal variable control on.
1 ( | control_on := ( true when set )
2 default ( false when cancel )
3 default ( control_on$ init false )
4
5 | ctrl_on_disp := control_on
6
7 | cruise_speed := ( speed when set ) default ( (cruise_speed$ init
0)+1 when speed_inc )
8 default ( (cruise_speed$ init 0) -1 when speed_dec )
9 default ( cruise_speed$ init 0 )
10
11 | throttle := ( false when ( (speed >= cruise_speed) and
control_on) )
12
12 default ( true when (( speed < cruise_speed) and control_on) )
13 default false
14
15 | brake := ( false when ((speed <= cruise_speed) and control_on) )
16 default ( true when ( (speed > cruise_speed) and control_on) )
17 default false
18 | )
Listing 2.3: Cruise Control: Signal Assignments
Line 7 provides that when set is asserted, the current value of speed is saved in
the internal variable cruise speed; else if speed inc or speed dec are asserted, the
value of cruise speed is incremented or decremented, respectively, by one unit. The
default value of cruise speed is otherwise its previous-step value cruise speed$.
For cruise control to effect a speed increase, the output signal throttle is used.
Line 11 states throttle will only be true when control on is active and the value
of input signal speed, the current vehicle speed, is below cruise speed. The output
signal brake is also only true when control on is active, but instead requires the
speed to be greater than cruise speed.
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CHAPTER 3
AN OVERVIEW OF SAGA
3.1 SAGA Defined
The SIGNAL Auto-Generated Assayer (SAGA) is an automated validation tool for
synchronous reactive embedded systems. It is built to work with SIGNAL programs as
part of an investigation of the automatic testing of synchronous reactive systems. The
main purpose of SAGA is to shift the testing effort associated with critical systems
from the onerous procedure of manually creating individual test cases to reasoning
about the safety and environment properties of a system.
SAGA provides a framework with which, given the current-day computational
resources and a properly specified environment, a system may be simulated through
multiple lifetimes of operation under varying scenarios; hence, rather than using an
exhaustive exploration, SAGA provides the means for conducting a smart search in
the practically infinite state space of a modern non-trivial application.
3.2 Approach
When a SIGNAL program is compiled, source code is generated in either C, C++
or Java code by the Polychrony Environment [11]. The generated code can be used
for simulation or deployment purposes. SAGA works with the simulation executable
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program compiled from C code. The diagram in Figure 3.1 illustrates the general
architecture of SAGA. Given the executable program of the system-under-test, only
information about the system interface concerning the inputs and outputs must be
furnished to SAGA. This allows for black-box testing where no knowledge is required
of the system code, which may be proprietary or confidential. SAGA reads the
interface information from a user-provided initialization file.
Figure 3.1: Architecture Diagram of SAGA
In addition to the initialization file, SAGA makes use of an environment descrip-
tion file and a safety description file containing the environment and safety properties,
respectively, specified by a user for a system. The properties in these files are written
with SAGA-specific syntax. Complete with these files, SAGA can run a validation
session of specified length. The length in a session is defined by the number of steps
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(discrete logical instants) through which the system must be elapsed. During each
step, SAGA generates a set of inputs to the system-under-test in accordance with the
environment properties and checks the corresponding system behavior against the
safety properties.
Upon the completion of each session, a log is generated of the entire simulation.
This log contains the values of the provided inputs and observed outputs at each
step. If a safety violation was detected during the test, a warning is displayed on
the standard output and the corresponding step at which the problem occurred is
annotated in the log. The entire data set is formatted in a comma-separated values
(CSV) file for ease of data manipulation in parsing or generation of visual graphs.
3.3 Environment Simulation
The SAGA simulated environment is generated in accordance to the user-provided
environment description. The environment is reactive with the system-under-test and
therefore also takes into account the past inputs and outputs. For this reason, the user
may specify initial conditions to the system (initial I/O values). For data-direction
clarity, the convention is used of referring to signals from the environment to the
system-under-test as inputs, and signals from the system-under-test to the environ-
ment as outputs. SAGA currently supports integer and Boolean data-types as input
and output for environment simulation. For integer input generation, the user may
specify a value range by setting max and min values. The default value range is the
compiler-specific signed integer range. A linear constraint may also be set on the in-
teger inputs, where a value may only increment or decrement by a single unit during
each step.
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It is important to note that since outputs are the response of the system-under-test
to the simulated environment, only the generation of inputs to the system-under-test
is controlled by SAGA. The overall behavior of the environment, i.e generated in-
puts, is obtained from the collection of individually specified environment properties.
To specify environment properties, the following four mechanisms which are incor-
porated into SAGA may be used: explicit constraint, probability-based constraint,
operational-profile, and pattern profile. These mechanisms make use of a variety of
logical and relational operators, such as greater-than, less-than-or-equal-to, not-equal-
to, etc. The mechanisms available, thoroughly detailed in Chapter 4, are introduced
here:
• Explicit Constraint : a constraint between either a) an input and an output
signal, b) two input signals, or c) an input signal and a value. The type of
constraint is defined by the logical or relational operator used. The explicit
constraint is satisfied by SAGA at every step in the simulation, meaning appro-
priate values are assigned to the input signal(s) so as to make the constraint
true. For example, when an explicit constraint relating an input to an output is
declared, such as input1 < output1, SAGA satisfies this condition by assigning
a value to input1 that is less than the value of output1.
• Probability-based Constraint : a constraint defined similarly to an explicit con-
straint, but rather than being satisfied at every step, is only satisfied on a
specified probability bias. The specified probability bias P , a real number con-
tained in [0, 1], corresponds to the probability of an associated constraint C
being satisfied during the current step in simulation. It holds therefore, that
the logical negation of the associated constraint, ¬C is satisfied on a 1−P basis.
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For example, a probability-based constraint such as P ( input1 < output1 )
= 0.75 states that during any given step, there is a 75% probability of input1
being less than output1 and hence a 25% probability of input1 being greater
than or equal to output1.
• Operational Profile: a reaction to a specified system event. The system event
is denoted as an enter-condition, which is a propositional statement about the
values of the previous-step signals. Given the enter-condition to an operational
profile is true, then an associated constraint is satisfied on a specified probabil-
ity bias. An operational profile is a probability-based constraint which becomes
active if its enter-condition is true. The associated constraint condition is sat-
isfied in the current step. For example, OP input1 = true − > P( input1
= true ) = 0.85 END OP means that if the value of input1 was true in
the previous step (i.e. the enter-condition is true), then current step value of
input1 has an 85% probability of being true. If the enter-condition is false, no
assertion is made about the current value of input1. It is of special importance
to note, as this example demonstrated, that an enter-condition refers to the
previous step I/O values, and the constraint which must be satisfied pertains
to the current step values.
• Pattern Profile: a sequence of reactions to a specified system event. Given the
enter-condition of a pattern profile property evaluates to true, the first con-
straint in a sequence of probability constraints is satisfied on a specified prob-
ability bias. On the following execution step, the next probability constraint is
likewise satisfied; therefore, each constraint in a pattern has a its own specified
18
probability bias. The pattern exits once a constraint is not satisfied (i.e. when
a probability evaluates to false). After exiting, the enter-condition must once
again be true for the pattern to be re-entered. An example pattern profile is as
follows,
PATTERN output3 = 100 − > P( input2 = 2 ) = 0.95 − > P( input2 =
4 ) = 1 − > P( input2 = 8 ) = 0.9 END PATTERN. Given output3 had
a value of 100 in the previous step, there is a 95% chance input2 will be given
a value of 2 in the current step. Subsequently, input2 is guaranteed (100%
probability) to be assigned the value 4 in the following step and has a 90%
chance of having a value of 8 two steps ahead. The probabilities assigned in a
pattern profile are viewed as independent events relating to the current step of
execution, consequently the actual probability of satisfying the last constraint
in a sequence is in reality a compound probability (trivially, the product of all
preceding probabilities).
Altogether, the validation methods in conjunction with relational operators allow
for a wide-range of specifications which may be tailored to different types of systems
and testing goals. A proper environment description in which a combination of com-
mon patterns of operation that occasionally deviate from typical behavior allows for
an extensive exploration of the relevant state space of a system. Furthermore, the
environment properties may be written so as to conduct specialized tests to search
around system thresholds and boundary conditions in order to increase robustness.
19
3.4 Safety Validation
During each step in a simulation, the safety validation phase occurs after the
system-under-test has reacted to the SAGA generated inputs. The validation process
in SAGA consists of checking the execution of the system against the user specified
safety properties. Similar to the environment description, the safety description is a
collection of individual properties that together encompass the overall safe behavior
of a system. The safety properties must therefore be written so as to express the
conservative set of states in which nothing bad happens.
In SAGA, safety properties are written as invariant propositional statements on
the inputs and outputs of a system with the use of logical and mathematical relational
operators. Each property must be true throughout the entire execution for a system
to be safe. The safe behavior of a system is therefore contained in the intersection of
the set of states described by each safety property, as is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Although, the use of temporal logic is not fully incorporated into SAGA valida-
tion, a delay operator $ allows invariant properties to be set between current and
previous-step signals. The delay operator $, inherited from the Signal language, al-
lows one to refer to the previous-step value of a signal. It can be used by appending
it to an input or output signal as such: input3$. This operator can therefore be used
to include temporal aspects into a safety property.
Individual safety properties may be specified as single or multiple nested propo-
sitional statements by using logical operators and parenthesis. For example, using
Boolean data-type signals output1, and output2 a property could be written us-
ing logical operators as follows, SAFE output1 OR output2 END SAFE. The
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Figure 3.2: Safety Properties and the System State Space
property states that either output1 or output2 must always be true. A second prop-
erty could be specified using a integer data-type signal output3, a relational opera-
tor, and the delay operator, in the following manner, SAFE output3 > output3$
END SAFE. This property checks that the current value of output3 is always
greater than its previous step value output3$. With proper use of parenthesis and
logical connectives, individual properties may be as extensive as necessary. By nest-
ing statements and using basic operators, a more complex property may be written
as follows, SAFE ( output3 > 100 ) AND ( ( output1 = output1$ ) OR (
input1 ≥ output3 ) ) END SAFE. The requirements this property imposes on a
system, is that output3 must be greater than 100 and either the value of output1
is equal to its past value or input1 is greater-than-or-equal to output3. Generally,
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a safety violation is detected by SAGA during the validation phase when any one of
the properties, such as the ones presented here, in a safety description evaluate to
false during any given step in a simulation.
The aim of a well-written safety description must be to conservatively restrict the
system to trusted behavior. It may be challenging to produce safety properties at
times because it is not always evident what kind of system behavior can cause prob-
lems; however, even when SAGA does not detect an error condition due to lack of a
thorough specification, an inspection of the simulation log may in many cases reveal
program bugs. Furthermore, engagement in the activity of creating safety properties





4.1 Compiling and Running SAGA
SAGA is a console application that accepts the required specification files and
optional flags as parameters to run a simulation. In order to install SAGA, it must
first be compiled from source code. To compile the latest version of SAGA, a plain
“make” command can be used on the makefile provided in the base directory of
the source code folder. The makefile requires the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC).
Upon compilation, an executable “SAGA” is generated in the base directory. This
executable may be moved to the desired installation directory. SAGA may then be
executed from its install directory as a console application using a UNIX shell. Upon
running SAGA without providing parameters, the following help menu is displayed
which explains the use of individual flags:
Usage:
SAGA [flags] ... [length] [init_file] [env_file] [safe_file]
Description:
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Run a validation session of length [length] for a specified
system , whose I/O interface is contained in [init_file ]. The
environment is generated with respect to the properties
specified in [env_file] and the system is validated with
respect to the properties specified in [safe_file ]. The output
of the session is logged in a comma separated variable file
"[ system name]_trace_[TIMESTAMP ].csv".
Flags:
-v
Verbose mode. Provides detailed information about the
simulation. It is recommended to pipe the output of SAGA
to a text file when using verbose mode. An example
execution would be of the format:
SAGA -v 100 init.txt env.txt safe.txt > log.txt
-i
Manual initialization. A prompt is provided to enter
information about the System (rather than providing [
initial_file] ).
-help init
Provides information about the contents and format of the
initialization file as required by SAGA.
-help env
Provides information about the contents and format of the
environment description file as required by SAGA.
-help safe
Provides information about the contents and format of the
safety description file as required by SAGA.
Listing 4.1: SAGA Help Menu
The file parameters [init_file], [env_file], [safe_file] above refer to the
directory location of the initialization, environment, and safety files, respectively.
The test length parameter, [length], specifies the number of steps (discrete logical
instants) in the simulation. As an example, the configuration of SAGA for a validation
session of the cruise control system introduced in Section 2.2.2 is used in this and
following sections. To execute SAGA for the purpose of running a validation session
on the cruise control system, the following command is used:
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SAGA -v 50 cruiseControl_init.txt cruiseControl_env.txt cruiseControl_safe.txt
In the above command, the flag “-v” provides a verbose output to the standard
output regarding the status of the simulation. The files cruiseControl_init.txt,
cruiseControl_env.txt, and cruiseControl_safe.txt represent the correspond-
ing initialization, environment, and safety descriptions located in the local SAGA
directory and used for the cruise control system. Each file is presented in the follow-
ing sections.
4.2 Specifying Initialization
In order to run a simulation, SAGA requires interface information about the
system-under-test. The interface information can be provided to SAGA through
an initialization file or manually through a prompt by using the -i flag. Since the
prompt for manually entering information is self-explanatory, only the initialization
file format is presented here. The initialization file requires information about the
inputs and outputs of the system-under-test, and allows the user to specify system
initial conditions and set options regarding environment control.
4.2.1 File Format
The initialization file must contain the complete interface information of the
system-under-test regarding the name of the executable program and its input and
output signals. In addition, an initial value can be specified for any I/O signal in the
file to start a simulation from a predetermined state. Integer input signals must be
specified with additional attributes including min and max values, as well as whether
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or not they should be linearly constrained. For linearly constrained integer signals, the
environment will only generate values within single-unit increments or decrements.
The information is parsed from the file in a specific order and therefore the file must
be formatted properly.
The required information and ordering is as follows:
1. The name of the executable program for the system-under-test.
2. The number of Boolean input signals.
3. The number of Boolean output signals.
4. The number of integer input signals.
5. The number of integer output signals.
6. A list of the Boolean input names and initial values, for example:
Boolean_input 0
7. A list of the Boolean output names and initial values, for example:
Boolean_output 1
8. A list of the integer input names, their corresponding initial, min, and max
values, and whether or not ( 1 or 0) they should be linearly constrained, for
example:
integer_input 35 0 400 1
9. A list of the integer output names and their corresponding initial values, for
example:
integer_output 5
In the initialization file, tab and newline characters are effectively treated the same
as space characters and can be used as delimiters for organization. The data provided
must be consistent throughout; therefore the number of signals of each data-type
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specified, must match an equivalent count of signal names. If there any inconsistencies
in the file are detected, SAGA will produce a relevant error and quit. For any value in
the file, the place holder “x” can be used to generate default values. By default, integer
input signals have min and max values equivalent to the corresponding compiler-
specific min and max signed integer values, and are not linearly constrained. For
any signal, its default initial condition is randomly chosen. By random, it is meant a
uniform probability of its possible values.
4.2.2 Example: Cruise Control Initialization
A sample configuration for the cruise control system with the interface information
provided in Section 2.2.2 is as follows:
1 % -----------------------------
2 % --------cruiseControl -------
3 % -----------------------------
4
5 % Name of system -under -test
6 cruiseControl
7
8 % Number of Boolean input and output signals
9 % [No. input] [No. output]
10 4 3
11
12 % Number of Integer input and output signals
13 % [No. input] [No. output]
14 1 0
15
16 % Names of Boolean signals (must match SUT signal name) and initial
values
17 % [name] [init_value]









26 % Names of Integer signals (must match SUT signal name), initial
value
27 % minimum value , maximum value , and linear constraint
28 % [name] [init_value] [min_value] [max_value] [linear]
29 speed 30 0 300 1 % input
Listing 4.2: Contents of “cruiseControl init.txt”
The initialization file presented above follows the formatting specified in Section
4.2.1. The Boolean values true and false are represented using 1 and 0 respectively.
Furthermore, comments are included to help organize the file. The percent charac-
ter % is universally used by SAGA to denote a comment; therefore, any characters
following the percent character in a line are ignored.
4.3 Specifying the Environment
The environment description is a collection of properties which are used to describe
the behavior of the system environment. The different types of properties which
can be used are described in Section 3.3. In this section, the syntax of each type
of property is detailed and examples of properties as applied to the environment
description of the cruise control system are provided.
4.3.1 Syntax
The syntax is formally introduced in Backus-Naur Form (BNF). The four mech-
anisms for describing the environment properties are defined as follows:
Explicit Constraint
explicit constraint ::= in signal operator ( signal | value )
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signal ::= in signal | out signal | prev signal
out signal ::= output signal
in signal ::= input signal
prev signal ::= in signal$ | out signal$
value ::= Boolean | integer
operator ::= logical | relational
Probability-based Constraint
probability constraint ::= P( explicit constraint ) = probability
probability ::= 0 ≤ real ≤ 1
Operational Profile
operational profile ::= OP enter condition -> probability constraint END OP
enter condition ::= prev signal operator ( prev signal | value )
Pattern Profile
pattern ::= PATTERN enter cond -> prob const lst END PATTERN
prob const lst ::= probability constraint | probability constraint -> prob const lst
The available operators are provided in Table 4.1. In general, relational operators
can be used on integer data-type signals, while logical operators can be used on
Boolean data-type signals or with expressions which evaluate to a Boolean value. The







Greater Than >,>= Relational
Less Than <,<= Relational
Increment + Arithmetic
Decrement - Arithmetic
Table 4.1: SAGA Operators
a specified value. They effectively add or subtract the value of the right expression
to/from the signal on the left side.
When generating the environment during each step, SAGA ensures that every
input signal is assigned a value. Given an environment description is composed of one
or more properties, individual signals can be used in more than one property. Priority
is given to satisfying signals in properties in the following order: pattern profile,
operational profile, probability-based constraint, and explicit constraint. When a
signal is used in two properties of the same type, the first property in top-down
order in the description file is used to generate a value for the signal. When a signal
which has already been assigned a value is used in a property that relates it to a
different signal which has not been assigned a value, the property is satisfied by
only assigning a new value to the second signal, or ignored if the constraint is not
satisfiable. Furthermore, when a signal is not used in any one property, by default it
is assigned a random value within its defined range.
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4.3.2 Example: Cruise Control Environment
The following excerpt provides properties used to describe a realistic environment
for the cruise control system.
1 % Speed up when throttle is activated
2 OP throttle = 1 -> P( speed > speed$ ) = 1 END_OP
3
4 % Driver increases speed more often when in cruise control
5 P( speed_inc = 1 ) = 0.60
6 P( speed_dec = 1 ) = 0.20
7
8 % If user decreases speed , more likely to continue decreasing
9 OP speed_dec$ = 1 -> P( speed_dec = 1 ) = 0.7
10
11 % Speed sensor fault
12 P( speed > 9000 ) = 0.01
Listing 4.3: Excerpt from “cruiseControl env.txt”
In line 2 of Listing 4.3, we observe a property of the environment which states that
when the Boolean output throttle is true, the integer input speed will increase in
value i.e. have a greater value than speed$, its previous-cycle value. The environment
models the theoretical driver as someone who tends to increase their speed more often
when they are using the cruise control feature of the automobile, as is illustrated in
lines 5 and 6, by assigning a higher probability to the speed inc input signal; however,
the property in line 9, accounts for the fact that if a driver decreases speed once, they
will more than likely continually do so. Finally, the property in line 12 states there
is a 1% probability that the value of speed is over 9000, which effectively simulates
a sensor glitch with a discontinuous jump to a large, unrealistic value.
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4.4 Specifying Safety Validation
The safety description is a collection of properties that specify the safe behavior
of a system. These properties are checked at every step in a simulation. A violation
of safety in the system is detected when any of the properties evaluates to false. This
concept is more thoroughly described in Section 3.4.
4.4.1 Syntax
A safety property can be defined by a single expression or by multiple expressions
connected by well-formed parentheses and logical operators as follows:
safety property ::= SAFE first expression END SAFE
first expression ::= expression operator expression
expression ::= signal | value | “ ( ” expression operator expression “ ) ”
signal ::= input signal | output signal | prev signal
out signal ::= output signal
in signal ::= input signal
prev signal ::= in signal$ | out signal$
value ::= Boolean | integer
operator ::= logical | relational
This format allows for basic propositional statements, as well as more complex
statements containing several nested parenthesis. A current limitation on the syntax
is that each nested expression must consist of three arguments, where the the middle
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argument must be a operator and the leftmost and rightmost arguments can be a
signal, value, or a subsequent nested expression.
4.4.2 Example: Cruise Control Safety
The following Listing provides properties taken from the safety description used
with the cruise control system.
1 % Throttle or brake control should not be active if cruise control
is OFF
2 SAFE ( ( throttle or brake ) and ( ctrl_on_disp = 0 ) ) = 0 END_SAFE
3
4 % Brake and throttle should not be activated simultaneously
5 SAFE ( brake = 0 ) or ( throttle = 0 ) END_SAFE
6
7 % When cancel is true , cruise , throttle , and brake control should be
OFF
8 SAFE ( ( cancel = 1 ) and ( ( ( ctrl_on_disp = 0) and ( throttle = 0
) ) and ( brake = 0 ) ) ) or ( cancel = 0 ) END_SAFE
Listing 4.4: Excerpt from “cruiseControl safe.txt”
A very basic expectation of a cruise control system is declared in line 2 of List-
ing 4.4, which states that neither throttle or brake should be asserted while the
cruise control is OFF, as is indicated by ctrl on disp, the control state display.
Furthermore, the property in line 5 stipulates that brake and throttle should not
be asserted simultaneously. The last property in line 8 states that when cancel is




The output of every validation session in SAGA is logged in a CSV file named
[system name] trace [time stamp].csv. This file contains the values generated
and received at every step. When a safety violation is detected, a warning is displayed
on the standard output and the log is annotated on the corresponding step.
Given the initialization, environment, and safety descriptions provided for the ex-
ample cruise control system, the results of the first ten steps are displayed in Figure
4.1. These values show that the set signal was asserted at logical time two and ef-
fectively turned cruise control ON. Throughout the following steps, the speed inc
signal is asserted, which in turn activates throttle and effects increases in speed.
Figure 4.1: Cruise Control Simulation Log
By plotting the values generated by SAGA for the speed signal, a visual repre-
sentation of the system behavior is obtained in Figure 4.2. The figure is annotated
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with key events from the simulation.
Figure 4.2: Speed Signal in Cruise Control
The visual representation of the data shows typical, expected operation of the
cruise control; however, a warning on the standard display and an inspection of the
simulation log yield a surprise on cycle #36 displayed in Figure 4.3. The detected
error is apparent upon examination of the input and output signals. The problem,
evident by the status display ctrl on disp, is that the system turned ON and re-
mained ON, even though the cancel input was asserted.
Upon examination of the cruise control system Signal specification introduced in
Section 2.2.2 the error points to the implementation of the local variable control on
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Figure 4.3: A Safety Violation
used to process the state of the system. The faulty code snippet is provided in Listing
4.5.
1 | control_on := ( true when set )
2 default ( false when cancel )
3 default ( control_on$ init false )
Listing 4.5: Cruise Control: A Bug Exposed
The test case exposed that when set and cancel where simultaneously asserted,
cancelwas ignored. Therefore, if a driver operating this system would have attempted
to turn OFF cruise control and accidentally pressed both set and cancel, the system
would have remained ON. This implementation is not correct with the desired safe
specification of the system. Semantically, the root of the problem is the improper use
of the default operator in the program. In Signal, the default operator gives priority
to its left argument, and only if the left expression evaluates to false is the right
expression evaluated. An appropriate correction in this example is to give cancel
priority over set as is done in the altered code snippet in Listing 4.6.
36
1 | control_on := ( false when cancel )
2 default ( true when set )
3 default ( control_on$ init false )
Listing 4.6: Cruise Control: Altered Code
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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDY: STEAM BOILER
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the simulation
and validation capabilities of SAGA as applied to a system of substantial complexity.
To that end, a well-known verification problem, the steam boiler control specification
[2], was chosen. This specification has been often used for the purpose of demonstrat-
ing the application of formal methods to a real-life industrial application in order to
unify scientific progress in the field with practices in industry [3]. The steam boiler
problem, though most frequently used for examples of verification, was selected since
its full specification is readily available and many in the target audience are familiar
with it. The specification is used to develop an initial implementation of a steam
boiler system with the SIGNAL programming language. Given the purpose of testing
is to expose the presence of errors, not prove their absence, the goal in implementing
the steam boiler is to provide a working example with which the effectiveness of the
validation process in SAGA of exposing errors can be qualitatively assessed.
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5.2 Steam Boiler Specification
A steam boiler program is a control application that moderates the level of water
inside a steam boiler by turning water pumps ON and OFF. The control program must
function properly; otherwise a quantity of water too high or too low could damage
the steam boiler or the driven turbine. An informal specification for such a system
constitutes the steam boiler specification problem presented in [2]. The case study
program is implemented directly from the aforementioned text. A brief overview of
the specification is provided here. For the complete specification details, the reader
should refer to the original text. The SAGA files and the full program listing of
the SIGNAL implementation of the steam boiler developed for this case study are
provided in Appendix B. For ease of readability, the input and output signals in the
implementation are consistent with the naming of the sent and received messages of
the original specification.
5.2.1 Overview
A diagram of the steam boiler environment is depicted in Figure 5.1. This diagram
demonstrates the constraints of the control application, which are namely the water
level limits and the available physical devices. The implemented values associated
with each water level limit are presented in Table 5.1.
The steam boiler physical environment effectively consists of four pump units, a
water release valve, a water level sensor, and a steam sensor. Each pump unit consists
of a pump, which can be turned ON and OFF by the program, and a pump controller
that provides information to the program regarding whether or not water is flowing
through the pump. The program is informed of the current amount of water in the
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Parameter Comment Value Unit
C Maximal Capacity 150 liter
M1 Minimal Limit 20 liter
M2 Maximal Limit 130 liter
N1 Minimal Normal 60 liter
N2 Maximal Normal 90 liter
Table 5.1: Implementation Values of Physical Constants
steam boiler and the amount of steam being produced, by a water level sensor and
a steam sensor, respectively. The water release valve is used by the program only
during start-up in order to lower the amount of water to the desired initial level.
Figure 5.1: Steam Boiler Physical Diagram
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The steam boiler program can be modeled as a synchronous system since it must
follow a five second cycle, denoted as a step, in which the reception of messages,
analysis of information received, and response to messages must happen, in that order.
A simplified diagram of the steam boiler program interface is presented in Figure 5.2.
The input and output signals constitute the messages between the program and the
physical units.
Figure 5.2: Steam Boiler Program Simplified Interface
The behavior of the steam boiler program is primarily determined by its current
mode. The five possible modes of operation are the following:
• Initialization: The program begins in this mode from start-up. It awaits until
the steam boiler is ready, and ensures the water level is initially within N1 and
N2 by opening the water release valve or activating a pump if necessary before
starting.
• Normal : While in this mode, the program tries to maintain the water level
closely within N1 and N2. The program remains in this mode while no faults
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are detected in the physical units and the water level is not risking reaching M1
or M2.
• Degraded : In this mode, the program attempts to maintain a satisfactory water
level given the presence of a fault on one of the physical units other than the
water level sensor.
• Rescue: When the water level sensor has a fault, the program enters this mode.
In this mode, the program attempts to maintain a satisfactory water level by
taking into account the maximum physical dynamics of the system.
• Emergency stop: The program enters this mode when the water level is risking
reaching M1 or M2, the external stop signal was asserted, or a message trans-
mission error is detected. In this mode, the program stops and the physical
environment is responsible for taking appropriate actions.
5.2.2 Implementation Limitations
The steam boiler program was implemented with some assumptions and limi-
tations. These choices where made in order to provide a simplistic model for the
physical evolution of the system, and to accommodate the fact that SAGA currently
only supports integer type numbers. The limitations are the following:
• Quantity measurements of liters are in whole units and are therefore represented
by integers. These include the steam output and water level measurements.
• A working pump will deliver water at its constant rate of 0.2 ltrs/sec (i.e. 1
liter every 5 seconds) where 5 seconds represent one step. This represents the
nominal capacity of each pump.
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Table 5.2: Program Mode Corresponding to mode Values
• The system produces steam in discrete values (ltrs/step) directly related to the
water level, as shown in Listing 5.4.
• The stop signal must only be asserted once, rather than three times in a row,
for the program to go into emergency stop mode.
5.3 Validation
Given a complete system specification, the validation process in SAGA is a straight
forward activity. The safety properties of a system can be directly implemented from
the specification, and thus be done concurrently with system design. The afore-
mentioned approach is taken in this case study. A large number of properties, each
relating to a functional requirement or set of requirements, may be written to pro-
duce a thorough validation. For brevity, only a handful of safety and environment
properties are presented here. A following discussion on some of the nontrivial errors
detected in the implementation is then provided.
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5.3.1 From Specification to Safety Description
A set of safety properties that correspond to the specification are presented in
Listing 5.1. As a reference, Table 5.2 provides the values corresponding to each pro-
gram mode for the signal mode in the implementation. In line 1, the property declares
that either the program is in emergency stop mode or the stop signal is not true. This
effectively states that the program should not be in a mode other than emergency
stop if the stop signal is asserted. The following property in line 3, provides that the
program cannot be in normal mode if the water level has reached or surpassed the
maximal or minimal limits. When a pump and pump controller do not have matching
states, it constitutes an equipment failure and the program must respond accordingly;
therefore, the property in line 5 states that if pump state1 and pump ctrl state1 do
not have the same value, the program must be in degraded, rescue, or emergency stop
mode. This property is also applied to pumps 2,3, and 4 (not shown here). Finally, the
properties declared starting at line 7 check for transmission failures by ensuring that
the program acknowledges every message received that requires an acknowledgment.
1 SAFE ( mode = 5 ) or ( stop != 1 ) END_SAFE
2
3 SAFE ( mode != 2 ) or ( ( level <= 130 ) and (level >= 20 ) )
END_SAFE
4
5 SAFE ( pump_state1 = pump_ctrl_state1 ) or ( ( ( mode = 3 ) or (
mode = 4 ) ) or ( mode = 5) ) END_SAFE
6
7 SAFE ( ( pump_repaired1$ == 1 ) and ( pump_repaired_ack1 == 1 ) ) or
( pump_repaired1$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
8 SAFE ( ( pump_ctrl_repaired1$ == 1 ) and ( pump_ctrl_repaired_ack1
== 1 ) ) or ( pump_ctrl_repaired1$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
9 SAFE ( ( level_repaired$ == 1 ) and ( level_repaired_ack == 1 ) ) or
( level_repaired$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
44
10 SAFE ( ( steam_repaired$ == 1 ) and ( steam_repaired_ack == 1 ) ) or
( steam_repaired$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
Listing 5.1: Steam Boiler Safety Properties
5.3.2 Environment Simulation
Two approaches are taken for simulating a test environment in this case study: (i)
describing a realistic runtime environment, where the typical operation of the system
under usual conditions can be inspected and (ii) describing a stress scenario in which
threshold values are exceeded and boundary operating cases are observed. The two
approaches are illustrated using portions of the steam boiler environment description
and their associated result.
Typical Operation
For the purpose of simulating the typical operation of the system, the environment
must be described so as to be correctly responsive to the system-under-test. This is
achieved by ensuring that the output of the program effects an appropriate change in
the environment. The properties in Listing 5.2 demonstrate this by assigning a high
probability to providing the correct response when a pump is opened or closed. The
response is the pump and pump controller state change according to the program
action.
1 OP close_pump1 = 1 -> P( pump_state1 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
2 OP close_pump2 = 1 -> P( pump_state2 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
3 OP close_pump3 = 1 -> P( pump_state3 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
4 OP close_pump4 = 1 -> P( pump_state4 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
5
6 OP open_pump1 = 1 -> P( pump_state1 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
7 OP open_pump2 = 1 -> P( pump_state2 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
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8 OP open_pump3 = 1 -> P( pump_state3 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
9 OP open_pump4 = 1 -> P( pump_state4 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
10
11 OP close_pump1 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state1 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
12 OP close_pump2 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state2 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
13 OP close_pump3 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state3 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
14 OP close_pump4 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state4 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
15
16 OP open_pump1 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state1 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
17 OP open_pump2 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state2 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
18 OP open_pump3 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state3 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
19 OP open_pump4 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state4 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
Listing 5.2: Following Program Orders
Furthermore, the water level is set to increase according the the number of active
pumps in Listing 5.3. Since each pump has a throughput of 1 ltr/step, the water
level must increase by 1 liter for each active pump at every step. The water level
of the steam boiler is also affected by the quantity of exiting steam. The amount of
water leaving as steam is subtracted from the water level in line 6. Finally, in line 8
when the water release valve is on, the water level is decreased at a constant rate of
4 liters/step.
1 OP pump_state1 = 1 -> P( level + 1 ) = 0.99 END_OP
2 OP pump_state2 = 1 -> P( level + 1 ) = 0.99 END_OP
3 OP pump_state3 = 1 -> P( level + 1 ) = 0.99 END_OP
4 OP pump_state4 = 1 -> P( level + 1 ) = 0.99 END_OP
5
6 P( level - steam ) = 1
7
8 OP valve = 1 -> P( level - 4 ) = 1 END_OP
Listing 5.3: Water Level
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For sake of simplicity, the amount of steam leaving the boiler is modeled based on
the current amount of water. Therefore the properties in Listing 5.4 provide a direct
relationship between the water level and steam output.
1 OP level <= 150 -> P( steam == 1 ) = 1 END_OP
2 OP level <= 80 -> P( steam == 2 ) = 1 END_OP
3 OP level <= 65 -> P( steam == 3 ) = 1 END_OP
4 OP level <= 20 -> P( steam == 4 ) = 1 END_OP
5 OP level <= 10 -> P( steam == 5 ) = 1 END_OP
Listing 5.4: Steam Production
An unsolicited signal indicating a unit fault is acknowledged or has been repaired
when the program has not sent a fault detected signal is considered an erroneous
transmission and will force the program to emergency stop mode; therefore, to keep
the environment running with minimal faults the signals by default are set false as is
shown in Listing 5.5. Solicited acknowledgments however, are given a high probability
of occurring. The “unit repaired” messages are treated similarly (not shown here).
1 pump_fault_ack1 = 0
2 pump_fault_ack2 = 0
3 pump_fault_ack3 = 0
4 pump_fault_ack4 = 0
5
6 pump_ctrl_fault_ack1 = 0
7 pump_ctrl_fault_ack2 = 0
8 pump_ctrl_fault_ack3 = 0
9 pump_ctrl_fault_ack4 = 0
10
11 level_fault_ack = 0
12 steam_outcome_fault_ack = 0
13
14 OP pump_fault_detected1$ == 1 -> P( pump_fault_ack1 = 1 ) = 1 END_OP
15 OP pump_fault_detected2$ == 1 -> P( pump_fault_ack2 = 1 ) = 1 END_OP
16 OP pump_fault_detected3$ == 1 -> P( pump_fault_ack3 = 1 ) = 1 END_OP
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17 OP pump_fault_detected4$ == 1 -> P( pump_fault_ack4 = 1 ) = 1 END_OP
18
19 OP pump_ctrl_fault_detected1$ == 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_fault_ack1 = 1 )
= 1 END_OP
20 OP pump_ctrl_fault_detected2$ == 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_fault_ack2 = 1 )
= 1 END_OP
21 OP pump_ctrl_fault_detected3$ == 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_fault_ack3 = 1 )
= 1 END_OP
22 OP pump_ctrl_fault_detected4$ == 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_fault_ack4 = 1 )
= 1 END_OP
23
24 OP level_fault_detected$ == 1 -> P( level_fault_ack = 1 ) = 1 END_OP
25 OP steam_fault_detected$ == 1 -> P( steam_outcome_fault_ack = 1 ) =
1 END_OP
Listing 5.5: Unsolicited and Solicited Messages
In the environment description presented, many actions that corresponds to the
expected behavior are given a high, though not absolute, probability of occurring.
This maintains that the system may still deviate from the typical operation and
therefore does not restrict the behavior in its entirety. The purpose of such a specifi-
cation is to create interesting observable events that may help expose bugs which are
not directly being searched.
With the specified properties, a simulation with test length of 150 steps is con-
ducted. The safety properties are temporarily ignored and discussed in the following
section. The SAGA initialization file is written to provide a cold start of the steam
boiler with an initial water level of 110. The resulting behavior is best observed by
plotting the interesting data. The values for the level signal, which represents the
water level, are observed in Figure 5.3 and the steam output is observed in Figure
5.4 by plotting the values for the steam signal.
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Figure 5.3: Steam Boiler Typical Operation: Water Level
Figure 5.4: Steam Boiler Typical Operation: Steam Output
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Given the initial water level value is above the maximal normal capacity, the
steam boiler opens the water release valve until the level is between minimal normal
and maximal normal. The program then issues the program ready signal and enters
normal mode. When in normal mode, the program effectively maintains the water
level in the normal operating range by opening and closing pumps accordingly.
Stress Operation
In order to observe the operation of the steam boiler program under a chaotic
scenario, an environment description that asserts the occurrence of a water leak is
used. Using the previous description from Section 5.3.2 to initially maintain the
typical system behavior, a single property, presented in Listing 5.6, can be added to
force the desired behavior. The water leak in the steam boiler is effectively simulated
using a patter profile whose enter-condition is satisfied when the current water level is
at a specific value (in this case 65 liters). The pattern ensures that level is continually
decreased until it reaches a very low value. Once the pattern profile is entered, the
constraints that sequentially follow are satisfied in subsequent steps. This behavior
is guaranteed because each constraint in the pattern has a 100% probability of being
satisfied.
1 PATTERN
2 level = 65
3 -> P( level - 4 ) = 1
4 -> P( level - 7 ) = 1
5 -> P( level - 9 ) = 1
6 -> P( level - 11 ) = 1
7 -> P( level - 13 ) = 1
8 END_PATTERN
Listing 5.6: Simulating a water leak
The result which the pattern profile effects in the simulation is shown in Figure
5.5, where the values of the level signal are plotted.
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Figure 5.5: Steam Boiler Stress Operation: Water Leak
5.3.3 Nontrivial Bugs
The validation process for the program reveals some safety violations with the
implementation contained in Appendix B. The nontrivial problems that were exposed
are described. The problems associated with each violation were determined after
inspection of the execution trace in the annotated simulation log. They are as follows:
• The program remains in normal mode when the pump controller only momen-
tarily changes to a state which does not match the corresponding pump state.
The proper behavior is for the program to enter degraded mode, given the
equipment failure is detected. The program should have then asserted the
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pump ctrl fault detected signal, in which case it must wait for an acknowl-
edgment pump ctrl fault ack and a subsequent repair message pump ctrl repaired
in order to return to normal mode. This error was detected due to a violation
of the safety property introduced in line 5 of Listing 5.1.
• When in rescue mode, the program may erroneously assert open pump and
close pump back-to-back repeatedly as high and low water level estimates reach
thresholds. The program enters rescue mode when a fault is detected in the
water level measuring unit, at which point it must calculate the water level based
on the amount of steam being produced and the throughput of the active pumps.
The open pump signal is asserted when the low estimate reaches the minimal
normal limit and the current state of the pump is closed. The close pump
signal is asserted when the high estimate reaches the maximal normal limit and
the current state of the pump is open. Therefore, when both the high and low
estimates reach their limit, the program generates the problematic behavior.
This problematic behavior was detected during an inspection of the system
runtime activity in a simulation log.
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CHAPTER 6
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
This chapter presents information about some of the important design decisions
and implementation details of SAGA. More specifically, it discusses why SIGNAL was
chosen as the target language, how a testing harness is built for a simulation, how
numerical probabilities are evaluated, and how environment generation and safety
validation are handled. The information presented here is not meant to serve as
an exhaustive design overview, but rather as a high-level description of some of the
important technical details of SAGA.
6.1 Why SIGNAL?
SAGA was developed as part of an investigatory project in automatic test case
generation from formal specifications. It has initially been designed to work with
synchronous programs specified in the SIGNAL language. SIGNAL was chosen as
the target synchronous language for several practical reasons. The SIGNAL compiler
is incorporated into the Polychrony tool set whose binaries and source are freely dis-
tributed under the GPLv2 license [28]. Also, the language is well documented since it
has accumulated an extensive amount of technical literature over the years. Although
SIGNAL has mostly been used in academic research rather than industry, it has been
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gaining the recent attention from industry due to its multi-rate (polychronous) nature
that makes it suitable for specifying parallel and distributed systems[12]. This aspect
of SIGNAL makes it suitable for a future direction of this project in the validation of
parallel and distributed systems.
6.2 Testing Harness
A black-box model of the system under test is used in SAGA for validation. In
order to achieve dynamic synchronous control of the program being tested, SAGA
creates a testing harness by making use of simulation executables generated from
the Polychrony environment. The simulation executables are SIGNAL programs that
have been compiled from code generated by the Polychrony environment. In order
to run a simulation with the executables, a user must create a file for each input and
output signal of the program. In the file, the user must enter the values for each
signal at every step [11]. SAGA takes advantage of this feature by using the files as
buffers in order to control the system under test. Figure 6.1 illustrates this concept.
Figure 6.1: Testing Harness for Dynamic Synchronous Control
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The intermediary files are created as named pipes in order to enable interpro-
cess communication between SAGA and the system under test. A named pipe is a
file type which allows multiple processes to simultaneously read and write from it.
This mechanism allows SAGA to generate values for all input signal and read values
from all output signals at every step, and therefore concurrently simulate a runtime
environment.
6.3 Evaluating Probabilities
The use of probabilities in SAGA gives great flexibility to attributing realistic
behaviors to an environment. It is important to understand on a quantitative basis the
meaning of such an operation in order to understand its capabilities and limitations.
The method of how probabilities are evaluated in SAGA is therefore presented here.
Given that a decision must be made with Px, a probability basis for property x,
then Rxy, a random number for property x during simulation step y, is generated by
SAGA. The following corresponding inequality is then evaluated:
(Rxy mod 100) + 1
100
≤ Px
where Px ∈ R , 0 ≤ Px ≤ 1, and Rxy ∈ Z+.
If the inequality is true, property x is satisfied in simulation step y. The ran-
dom number Rxy is generated using the pseudo-random sequence generation function
rand() from the standard C++ library. In order to provide distinct values for dif-
ferent simulations using the same initialization and environment description files, the




With speed being a crucial aspect of simulation tools, many design decisions were
made in consideration of running time. Generating the environment and checking
safety from properties composes the bulk of the computation work. The work done
by SAGA at each iteration is effectively bounded by the number of properties that
must be satisfied or checked, and the total number of system input and output signals.
In most cases, this number is relatively small compared to the total number of steps.
Furthermore, since each property is initially parsed from its description file and stored
in program memory, a file read operation bottle neck is avoided. The overall execution
time of a simulation in SAGA is therefore primarily dependent on the total number
of simulated steps (i.e. the user-specified test length).
Generating an environment consists of providing a value for every input signal to
the system at every simulation step. The values selected must be consistent with the
specified environment properties. At each step, every property in the list is evaluated
in the manner described in Section 3.3. This effectively assigns values to all the
signals which have properties associated with them. The set of possible values for the
remaining signals is only restricted by the signal data type and specified initialization
minimum and maximum values. These signals are therefore assigned a value randomly
chosen from their possible set.
Checking safety in a simulation entails verifying the specified properties hold at
every step in execution. In SAGA, each safety property is stored in a binary tree
data structure when it is first parsed from the description file. The binary tree allows
for an intuitive and organized way of checking the truth value of logical statements.
For example, the property in Listing 6.1, taken from the steam boiler case study, is
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stored in SAGA as illustrated in Figure 6.2. The tree arrangement is described using
the BNF symbols introduced in Section 4.4.1.
1 SAFE ( mode != 2 ) or ( ( level <= 130 ) and (level >= 20 ) )
END_SAFE
Listing 6.1: A Safety Property
Figure 6.2: Binary Tree Representation of a Safety Property
When a safety property is stored in SAGA, the operator of the first expression
always comprises the root node of the tree. Every node in the tree corresponds to the
operator in the local expression; therefore, each node must be composed of either two
child nodes, two leaves, or a node and a leaf. The leaves in the tree can be either a
signal or value. The tree structure is therefore always a full binary tree, where every
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node must have two children, but not a perfect binary tree because not all leaves will
have the same depth level.
In order to check the truth value of a property, a recursive function is used to
traverse the tree from the root node to the bottom-most nodes. Each node then
returns a value determined by evaluating with its operator the values of its child
nodes or leaves. The truth value of each node is computed as the function returns
back to the root node. Once both child nodes of the root note have returned a value,




7.1 Summary and Conclusion
The main contribution of this thesis is the design, implementation, and qualitative
assessment of SAGA, a prototype utility for the automated validation of SIGNAL
programs. SAGA provides a framework which shifts the testing effort associated
with critical systems from manually creating individual test cases to reasoning about
the safety and environment properties of a system. An overview of the methodology
and a detailed user’s guide of SAGA is presented. In the user’s guide, a thorough
example of SAGA as applied to the validation of a cruise control system is included
for completeness.
A qualitative assessment of the utility of SAGA is presented. The assessment
consists of a case study of SAGA as applied to the validation of the celebrated steam
boiler control specification problem, a system of substantial complexity. For this case
study, an implementation of the steam boiler program is developed in the SIGNAL
language. Results from the validation of the steam boiler program show that SAGA
is able to reveal non-trivial errors in the design of the system-under-test.
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7.1.1 Lessons from the Case Study
From the case study, the following important observations were made about the
validation process in SAGA:
• Given an initial specification of a system, the validation process in SAGA can
start concurrently with the design and development phases of the software de-
velopment cycle. This promotes, in general, a good practice for the development
of safe software systems.
• The SAGA environment description requires sufficient detail to expose inter-
esting system behavior, but should not be overly constraining. Given a loosely
specified environment where signal inputs are mostly generated randomly, a
system will seldom evolve into more interesting states. Conversely, if signals are
generated from an overly rigid specification, the system will always be tested
against the same input routines. The appropriate level of environment specifi-
cation must therefore be carefully considered and will be unique to each system
test agenda.
• Writing safety properties need not be an entirely creative process. Many of the
safety properties of a system can be systematically inferred from the system
specification itself.
7.2 Future Work
Future work of interest concerning the development of SAGA involves primarily
making technical improvements and additions. Three such improvements are key:
60
1. Full incorporation of temporal logic for the description of safety properties.
SAGA currently handles statements about the immediate previous state through
use of a delay operator, but does not support temporal propositions which make
use of other notions of time such as until or since. Incorporating temporal logic
for describing safety would provide more flexibility in the types of properties
that may be specified.
2. Support for polychronous systems. The SIGNAL language allows for the speci-
fication of polychronous systems, where each input signal has its own activation
clock. Currently, validation in SAGA is limited to single-clocked systems, where
all signals share the same activation clock (i.e. a value is generated for all signals
during every step). Adding support for the validation of polychronous systems
would require the incorporation of environment description mechanisms which
take into consideration the presence or absence (i.e. clock) of each signal. The
polychronous model provides suitable means for describing distributed systems,
a domain in which the application of automated validation is of interest.
3. Compatibility with other synchronous languages. SAGA has been initially de-
veloped to work with SIGNAL programs. Since SAGA performs black box test-
ing on compiled executables, the methodology for validation effectively remains
the same for all synchronous programs. The only accommodation required
would be a suitable testing harness for each program type. Of the synchronous




CRUISE CONTROL PROGRAM LISTING
1 % Cruise Control System
2 % Author: Vahid Rajabian Schwart
3
4 process cruiseControl = % ----- Cruise Control System ----- %
5 ( % inputs %
6 ? integer speed; % speed sensor %
7 boolean set , % turn ON cruise control %
8 cancel , % turn OFF cruise control %
9 speed_inc , % increase cruise speed %
10 speed_dec; % decrease cruise speed %
11 % outputs %
12 ! boolean throttle , % throttle control %
13 brake , % brake control %
14 ctrl_on_disp ;) % control indicator %
15 ( % system specification %
16 % clock restrictions %
17 | throttle ^= brake ^= ctrl_on_disp ^= speed
18 | speed ^= set ^= cancel ^= speed_inc ^= speed_dec
19
20 | control_on := ( true when set )
21 default ( false when cancel )
22 default ( control_on$ init false )
23
24 | ctrl_on_disp := control_on
25
26 | cruise_speed := ( speed when set ) default ( (cruise_speed$ init
0)+1 when speed_inc )
27 default ( (cruise_speed$ init 0) -1 when speed_dec )
28 default ( cruise_speed$ init 0 )
29
30 | throttle := ( false when ( (speed >= cruise_speed) and
control_on) )




34 | brake := ( false when ((speed <= cruise_speed) and control_on) )
35 default ( true when ( (speed > cruise_speed) and control_on) )
36 default false
37
38 | ) where % local variables %
39 boolean control_on; % cruise control state %
40 integer cruise_speed; % cruise control speed %






2 % Steam Boiler Initialization
3 %
4
5 % Name of system under test
6 steamBoiler
7
8 % Number of Boolean input and output signals
9 % [No. input] [No. output]
10 31 30
11
12 % Number of Integer input and output signals
13 % [No. input] [No. output]
14 2 1
15
16 % Names of Boolean signals (must match SUT signal name) and initial
value
17 % [name] [init_value]

































































81 % Names of Integer signals (must match SUT signal name), initial
value
82 % minimum value , maximum value , and linear constraint
83 % [name] [init_value] [min_value] [max_value] [linear]
84 level 110 0 900 1




2 % Safety Description
3 %
4
5 % Rescue or emergency stop mode if level sensor is faulty
6 SAFE ( ( level <= 150 ) and ( level >= 0 ) ) or ( ( mode = 4) or (
mode = 5 ) ) END_SAFE
7
8 % Emergency mode if stop is asserted
9 SAFE ( mode = 5 ) or ( stop != 1 ) END_SAFE
10
11 % Cannot be in normal mode unless water level is near max and min
normal
12 SAFE ( mode != 2 ) or ( ( level <= 110 ) and (level >= 40 ) )
END_SAFE
13
14 % Valve must only be used in initialization
15 SAFE ( valve = 0 ) or ( mode = 1 ) END_SAFE
16
17 % Pumps are working , or the program must be in degraded , rescue or
emergency stop mode
18 SAFE ( pump_state1 = pump_ctrl_state1 ) or ( ( ( mode = 3 ) or (
mode = 4 ) ) or ( mode = 5) ) END_SAFE
19 SAFE ( pump_state2 = pump_ctrl_state2 ) or ( ( ( mode = 3 ) or (
mode = 4 ) ) or ( mode = 5) ) END_SAFE
20 SAFE ( pump_state3 = pump_ctrl_state3 ) or ( ( ( mode = 3 ) or (
mode = 4 ) ) or ( mode = 5) ) END_SAFE
21 SAFE ( pump_state4 = pump_ctrl_state4 ) or ( ( ( mode = 3 ) or (
mode = 4 ) ) or ( mode = 5) ) END_SAFE
22
23 % Program must acknowledge messages
24 SAFE ( ( pump_repaired1$ == 1 ) and ( pump_repaired_ack1 == 1 ) ) or
( pump_repaired1$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
25 SAFE ( ( pump_repaired2$ == 1 ) and ( pump_repaired_ack2 == 1 ) ) or
( pump_repaired2$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
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26 SAFE ( ( pump_repaired3$ == 1 ) and ( pump_repaired_ack3 == 1 ) ) or
( pump_repaired3$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
27 SAFE ( ( pump_repaired4$ == 1 ) and ( pump_repaired_ack4 == 1 ) ) or
( pump_repaired4$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
28
29 SAFE ( ( pump_ctrl_repaired1$ == 1 ) and ( pump_ctrl_repaired_ack1
== 1 ) ) or ( pump_ctrl_repaired1$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
30 SAFE ( ( pump_ctrl_repaired2$ == 1 ) and ( pump_ctrl_repaired_ack2
== 1 ) ) or ( pump_ctrl_repaired2$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
31 SAFE ( ( pump_ctrl_repaired3$ == 1 ) and ( pump_ctrl_repaired_ack3
== 1 ) ) or ( pump_ctrl_repaired3$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
32 SAFE ( ( pump_ctrl_repaired4$ == 1 ) and ( pump_ctrl_repaired_ack4
== 1 ) ) or ( pump_ctrl_repaired4$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
33
34 SAFE ( ( level_repaired$ == 1 ) and ( level_repaired_ack == 1 ) ) or
( level_repaired$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
35 SAFE ( ( steam_repaired$ == 1 ) and ( steam_repaired_ack == 1 ) ) or
( steam_repaired$ == 0 ) END_SAFE
36
37 % Program should not open and close the same pump
38 SAFE ( open_pump1 = 0 ) or ( close_pump1 = 0 ) END_SAFE
39 SAFE ( open_pump2 = 0 ) or ( close_pump2 = 0 ) END_SAFE
40 SAFE ( open_pump3 = 0 ) or ( close_pump3 = 0 ) END_SAFE
41 SAFE ( open_pump4 = 0 ) or ( close_pump4 = 0 ) END_SAFE
B.3 Environment Description
1 %
2 % Steam Boiler Environment
3 %
4
5 % Respond to program ready
6 OP program_ready = 1 -> P( physical_units_ready = 1 ) = 0.99 END_OP
7
8 % Infrequent assertion of stop
9 P( stop = 1 ) = 0.01
10
11 % No steam output during initialization
12 OP mode = 1 -> P( steam = 0 ) = 1 END_OP
13
14 % Decrease water level when valve is open
15 OP valve = 1 -> P( level - 4 ) = 0.98 END_OP
16
17 % No unsolicited messages
18 steam_boiler_waiting = 0
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19 physical_units_ready = 0
20 pump_repaired1 = 0
21 pump_repaired2 = 0
22 pump_repaired3 = 0
23 pump_repaired4 = 0
24 pump_ctrl_repaired1 = 0
25 pump_ctrl_repaired2 = 0
26 pump_ctrl_repaired3 = 0
27 pump_ctrl_repaired4 = 0
28 level_repaired = 0
29 steam_repaired = 0
30 pump_fault_ack1 = 0
31 pump_fault_ack2 = 0
32 pump_fault_ack3 = 0
33 pump_fault_ack4 = 0
34 pump_ctrl_fault_ack1 = 0
35 pump_ctrl_fault_ack2 = 0
36 pump_ctrl_fault_ack3 = 0
37 pump_ctrl_fault_ack4 = 0
38 level_fault_ack = 0
39 steam_outcome_fault_ack = 0
40
41 % Close/open pumps according to program orders
42 OP close_pump1 = 1 -> P( pump_state1 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
43 OP close_pump2 = 1 -> P( pump_state2 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
44 OP close_pump3 = 1 -> P( pump_state3 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
45 OP close_pump4 = 1 -> P( pump_state4 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
46 OP open_pump1 = 1 -> P( pump_state1 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
47 OP open_pump2 = 1 -> P( pump_state2 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
48 OP open_pump3 = 1 -> P( pump_state3 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
49 OP open_pump4 = 1 -> P( pump_state4 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
50
51 OP close_pump1 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state1 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
52 OP close_pump2 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state2 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
53 OP close_pump3 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state3 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
54 OP close_pump4 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state4 == 0 ) = 0.95 END_OP
55 OP open_pump1 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state1 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
56 OP open_pump2 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state2 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
57 OP open_pump3 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state3 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
58 OP open_pump4 = 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_state4 == 1 ) = 0.95 END_OP
59
60 % Keep pump state constant unless changed by system
61 P( pump_state1 == pump_state1$ ) = 0.99
62 P( pump_state1 == pump_state2$ ) = 0.99
63 P( pump_state1 == pump_state3$ ) = 0.99
64 P( pump_state1 == pump_state4$ ) = 0.99
65
66 % Keep pump control state constant unless changed by system
67 P( pump_ctrl_state1 == pump_ctrl_state1$ ) = 0.99
68 P( pump_ctrl_state1 == pump_ctrl_state2$ ) = 0.99
69 P( pump_ctrl_state1 == pump_ctrl_state3$ ) = 0.99
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70 P( pump_ctrl_state1 == pump_ctrl_state4$ ) = 0.99
71
72 % Increase water level with each pump
73 OP pump_state1 = 1 -> P( level + 1 ) = 0.99 END_OP
74 OP pump_state2 = 1 -> P( level + 1 ) = 0.99 END_OP
75 OP pump_state3 = 1 -> P( level + 1 ) = 0.99 END_OP
76 OP pump_state4 = 1 -> P( level + 1 ) = 0.99 END_OP
77
78 % Decrease water level according to steam production %
79 OP steam != 0 -> P( level - steam ) = 1 END_OP % delete below lines
80
81 % Steam output increases as level decreases
82 OP level <= 150 -> P( steam == 1 ) = 1 END_OP
83 OP level <= 80 -> P( steam == 2 ) = 1 END_OP
84 OP level <= 65 -> P( steam == 3 ) = 1 END_OP
85 OP level <= 20 -> P( steam == 4 ) = 1 END_OP
86 OP level <= 10 -> P( steam == 5 ) = 1 END_OP
87
88 % Transmission responses
89 OP pump_fault_detected1$ == 1 -> P( pump_fault_ack1 = 1 ) = 1 END_OP
90 OP pump_fault_detected2$ == 1 -> P( pump_fault_ack2 = 1 ) = 1 END_OP
91 OP pump_fault_detected3$ == 1 -> P( pump_fault_ack3 = 1 ) = 1 END_OP
92 OP pump_fault_detected4$ == 1 -> P( pump_fault_ack4 = 1 ) = 1 END_OP
93
94 OP pump_ctrl_fault_detected1$ == 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_fault_ack1 = 1 )
= 1 END_OP
95 OP pump_ctrl_fault_detected2$ == 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_fault_ack2 = 1 )
= 1 END_OP
96 OP pump_ctrl_fault_detected3$ == 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_fault_ack3 = 1 )
= 1 END_OP
97 OP pump_ctrl_fault_detected4$ == 1 -> P( pump_ctrl_fault_ack4 = 1 )
= 1 END_OP
98
99 OP level_fault_detected$ == 1 -> P( level_fault_ack = 1 ) = 1 END_OP
100 OP steam_fault_detected$ == 1 -> P( steam_outcome_fault_ack = 1 ) =
1 END_OP
B.4 Program Listing
1 % Steam boiler controller initial implementation
2 % Author: Vahid Rajabian Schwart
3 % Implemented from the specification presented
4 % in: Jean -Raymond Abrial , Egon B r g e r , and Hans Langmaack.
5 % Formal Methods for Industrial Applications:
6 % Specifying and Programming the Steam Boiler Control.
69
7 % LNCS 1165, Springer -Verlag , October 1996.
8
9 process steamBoiler =
10 ( % inputs %
11 ? integer level ,
12 steam;
13
14 boolean stop ,
15 steam_boiler_waiting ,
16 physical_units_ready ,
17 pump_state1 , pump_state2 ,
18 pump_state3 , pump_state4 ,
19 pump_ctrl_state1 , pump_ctrl_state2 ,
20 pump_ctrl_state3 , pump_ctrl_state4 ,
21 pump_repaired1 , pump_repaired2 ,
22 pump_repaired3 , pump_repaired4 ,
23 pump_ctrl_repaired1 , pump_ctrl_repaired2 ,
24 pump_ctrl_repaired3 , pump_ctrl_repaired4 ,
25 level_repaired ,
26 steam_repaired ,
27 pump_fault_ack1 , pump_fault_ack2 ,
28 pump_fault_ack3 , pump_fault_ack4 ,
29 pump_ctrl_fault_ack1 , pump_ctrl_fault_ack2 ,




34 % outputs %
35 ! integer mode;
36
37 boolean program_ready ,
38 valve ,
39 open_pump1 , open_pump2 , open_pump3 , open_pump4 ,
40 close_pump1 , close_pump2 , close_pump3 , close_pump4 ,
41 pump_fault_detected1 , pump_fault_detected2 ,
42 pump_fault_detected3 , pump_fault_detected4 ,
43 pump_ctrl_fault_detected1 , pump_ctrl_fault_detected2 ,
44 pump_ctrl_fault_detected3 , pump_ctrl_fault_detected4 ,
45 level_fault_detected ,
46 steam_fault_detected ,
47 pump_repaired_ack1 , pump_repaired_ack2 ,
48 pump_repaired_ack3 , pump_repaired_ack4 ,
49 pump_ctrl_repaired_ack1 , pump_ctrl_repaired_ack2 ,





55 % clock equations: model as single -clocked system %
56 (
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57 | mode ^= program_ready ^= valve ^= open_pump1 ^= open_pump2 ^=
open_pump3 ^=
58 open_pump4 ^= close_pump1 ^= close_pump2 ^= close_pump3 ^=
close_pump4 ^=
59 pump_fault_detected1 ^= pump_fault_detected2 ^=
pump_fault_detected3 ^=
60 pump_fault_detected4 ^= pump_ctrl_fault_detected1 ^=
61 pump_ctrl_fault_detected2 ^= pump_ctrl_fault_detected3 ^=
62 pump_ctrl_fault_detected4 ^= level_fault_detected ^=
63 steam_fault_detected ^= pump_repaired_ack1 ^= pump_repaired_ack2
^=
64 pump_repaired_ack3 ^= pump_repaired_ack4 ^=
pump_ctrl_repaired_ack1 ^=
65 pump_ctrl_repaired_ack2 ^= pump_ctrl_repaired_ack3 ^=
66 pump_ctrl_repaired_ack4 ^= level_repaired_ack ^=
steam_repaired_ack ^=
67 level ^= steam ^= stop ^= steam_boiler_waiting ^=
physical_units_ready ^=
68 pump_state1 ^= pump_state2 ^= pump_state3 ^= pump_state4 ^=
69 pump_ctrl_state1 ^= pump_ctrl_state2 ^= pump_ctrl_state3 ^=
70 pump_ctrl_state4 ^= pump_repaired1 ^= pump_repaired2 ^=
pump_repaired3 ^=
71 pump_repaired4 ^= pump_ctrl_repaired1 ^= pump_ctrl_repaired2 ^=
72 pump_ctrl_repaired3 ^= pump_ctrl_repaired4 ^= level_repaired ^=
73 steam_repaired ^= pump_fault_ack1 ^= pump_fault_ack2 ^=
pump_fault_ack3 ^=
74 pump_fault_ack4 ^= level_fault_ack ^= steam_outcome_fault_ack ^=
75 pump_fault1 ^= pump_fault2 ^= pump_fault3 ^= pump_fault4 ^=
76 pump_ctrl_fault1 ^= pump_ctrl_fault2 ^= pump_ctrl_fault3 ^=
77 pump_ctrl_fault4 ^= water_level_measuring_unit_fault ^=
78 steam_level_measuring_unit_fault ^= transmission_fault ^=
79 steam_boiler_waiting_received ^= physical_units_ready_received ^=
80 rescue_estimate_high ^= rescue_estimate_low ^= pump_count ^= pmp1
^=
81 pmp2 ^= pmp3 ^= pmp4 ^= pump_fault_count ^= pmpflt1 ^= pmpflt2 ^=
82 pmpflt3 ^= pmpflt4 ^= steam_delta ^= level_delta
83
84 % program mode %
85 | mode := EMERGENCY_MODE when ( stop
86 or steam_level_measuring_unit_fault
87 or transmission_fault
88 or ( level >= (M2 -10) ) or ( level <= (M1+10) )
89 or (( mode$ init INIT_MODE = INIT_MODE) and (steam /=0) )
90 or ( water_level_measuring_unit_fault and (( mode$ init INIT_MODE
) = INIT_MODE) )
91 or ( (pump_fault1 or pump_ctrl_fault1)
92 and (pump_fault2 or pump_ctrl_fault2)
93 and (pump_fault3 or pump_ctrl_fault3)
94 and (pump_fault4 or pump_ctrl_fault4) ) ) default
95 RESCUE_MODE when ( physical_units_ready_received$ init false
96 and water_level_measuring_unit_fault ) default
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97 DEGRADED_MODE when ( physical_units_ready_received$ init false
98 and not(water_level_measuring_unit_fault)
99 and (pump_fault1 or pump_fault2 or pump_fault3 or pump_fault4
100 or pump_ctrl_fault1 or pump_ctrl_fault2
101 or pump_ctrl_fault3 or pump_ctrl_fault4) ) default
102 NORMAL_MODE when ( physical_units_ready_received$ init false )
103 default mode$ init INIT_MODE
104
105 % control %




109 | open_pump1 := ( true when ((level < N1) and (pump_state1=false))
default false )
110 when ( mode=NORMAL_MODE or mode=DEGRADED_MODE or mode=
INIT_MODE )
111 default ( true when (( rescue_estimate_low < N1) and (pump_state1
=false)) default false ) when ( mode = RESCUE_MODE )
112 default false
113 | open_pump2 := ( true when ((level < N1) and (pump_state2=false))
default false )
114 when ( mode=NORMAL_MODE or mode=DEGRADED_MODE or mode=
INIT_MODE )
115 default ( true when (( rescue_estimate_low < N1) and (pump_state2
=false)) default false ) when ( mode = RESCUE_MODE )
116 default false
117 | open_pump3 := ( true when ((level < N1) and (pump_state3=false))
default false )
118 when ( mode=NORMAL_MODE or mode=DEGRADED_MODE or mode=
INIT_MODE )
119 default ( true when (( rescue_estimate_low < N1) and (pump_state3
=false)) default false ) when ( mode = RESCUE_MODE )
120 default false
121 | open_pump4 := ( true when ((level < N1) and (pump_state4=false))
default false )
122 when ( mode=NORMAL_MODE or mode=DEGRADED_MODE or mode=
INIT_MODE )
123 default ( true when (( rescue_estimate_low < N1) and (pump_state4
=false)) default false ) when ( mode = RESCUE_MODE )
124 default false
125
126 | close_pump1 := ( true when ((level > N2) and (pump_state1=true))
default false )
127 when ( mode=NORMAL_MODE or mode=DEGRADED_MODE or mode=
INIT_MODE )
128 default ( true when (( rescue_estimate_high > N2 and (pump_state1
=true)) default false ) when ( mode = RESCUE_MODE )
129 default false
130 | close_pump2 := ( true when ((level > N2) and (pump_state2=true))
default false )
72
131 when ( mode=NORMAL_MODE or mode=DEGRADED_MODE or mode=
INIT_MODE )
132 default ( true when (( rescue_estimate_high > N2 and (pump_state2
=true)) default false ) when ( mode = RESCUE_MODE )
133 default false
134 | close_pump3 := ( true when ((level > N2) and (pump_state3=true))
default false )
135 when ( mode = NORMAL_MODE or mode=DEGRADED_MODE or mode=
INIT_MODE )
136 default ( true when (( rescue_estimate_high > N2 and (pump_state3
=true)) default false ) when ( mode = RESCUE_MODE )
137 default false
138 | close_pump4 := ( true when ((level > N2) and (pump_state4=true))
default false )
139 when ( mode=NORMAL_MODE or mode=DEGRADED_MODE or mode=
INIT_MODE )
140 default ( true when (( rescue_estimate_high > N2 and (pump_state4
=true)) default false ) when ( mode = RESCUE_MODE )
141 default false
142
143 % rescue mode calculations %
144 % estimate water level %
145 % high estimate - assume faulty pumps are open %
146 | rescue_estimate_high := (level$ init 0) when (
water_level_measuring_unit_fault
147 and not(water_level_measuring_unit_fault$ init false))
148 default ( (rescue_estimate_high$ init 0) - steam + pump_count +
pump_fault_count )
149 when ( water_level_measuring_unit_fault )
150 default level
151 % low estimate - assume faulty pumps are closed %
152 | rescue_estimate_low := (level$ init 0) when (
water_level_measuring_unit_fault
153 and not(water_level_measuring_unit_fault$ init false))
154 default ( (rescue_estimate_low$ init 0) - steam + pump_count)
155 when ( water_level_measuring_unit_fault )
156 default level
157
158 % count working pumps %
159 | pmp1 := 0 when ( (pump_fault1 or pump_ctrl_fault1) and not(
pump_state1$ init false) ) default 1
160 | pmp2 := 0 when ( (pump_fault2 or pump_ctrl_fault2) and not(
pump_state2$ init false) ) default 1
161 | pmp3 := 0 when ( (pump_fault3 or pump_ctrl_fault3) and not(
pump_state3$ init false) ) default 1
162 | pmp4 := 0 when ( (pump_fault4 or pump_ctrl_fault4) and not(
pump_state4$ init false) ) default 1
163 | pump_count := ( pmp1 + pmp2 + pmp3 + pmp4 )
164
165 % count faulty pump units ( controller or pump ) %
166 | pmpflt1 := 1 when ( pump_fault1 or pump_ctrl_fault1) default 0
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167 | pmpflt2 := 1 when ( pump_fault2 or pump_ctrl_fault2) default 0
168 | pmpflt3 := 1 when ( pump_fault3 or pump_ctrl_fault3) default 0
169 | pmpflt4 := 1 when ( pump_fault4 or pump_ctrl_fault4) default 0
170 | pump_fault_count := ( pmpflt1 + pmpflt2 + pmpflt3 + pmpflt4 )
171
172 % communications %
173 | program_ready := ( true when ( steam_boiler_waiting_received and
(steam = 0 )
174 and ( level < N2 ) and ( level > N1 ) ) default false)
175 when ( mode = INIT_MODE )
176 default false
177
178 % Acknowledge messages %
179 | pump_repaired_ack1 := true when ( pump_repaired1$ init false )
default false
180 | pump_repaired_ack2 := true when ( pump_repaired2$ init false )
default false
181 | pump_repaired_ack3 := true when ( pump_repaired3$ init false )
default false
182 | pump_repaired_ack4 := true when ( pump_repaired4$ init false )
default false
183
184 | pump_ctrl_repaired_ack1 := true when ( pump_ctrl_repaired1$ init
false ) default false
185 | pump_ctrl_repaired_ack2 := true when ( pump_ctrl_repaired2$ init
false ) default false
186 | pump_ctrl_repaired_ack3 := true when ( pump_ctrl_repaired3$ init
false ) default false
187 | pump_ctrl_repaired_ack4 := true when ( pump_ctrl_repaired4$ init
false ) default false
188
189 | level_repaired_ack := true when ( level_repaired$ init false )
default false
190 | steam_repaired_ack := true when ( steam_repaired$ init false )
default false
191
192 % fault detection %
193 % pump faults %
194 | pump_fault1 := true when pump_fault_detected1
195 default false when pump_repaired1
196 default pump_fault1$ init false
197 | pump_fault2 := true when pump_fault_detected2
198 default false when pump_repaired2
199 default pump_fault2$ init false
200 | pump_fault3 := true when pump_fault_detected3
201 default false when pump_repaired3
202 default pump_fault3$ init false
203 | pump_fault4 := true when pump_fault_detected4
204 default false when pump_repaired4
205 default pump_fault4$ init false
206
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207 % pump controller faults %
208 | pump_ctrl_fault1 := true when pump_ctrl_fault_detected1
209 default false when pump_ctrl_repaired1
210 default pump_ctrl_fault1$ init false
211 | pump_ctrl_fault2 := true when pump_ctrl_fault_detected2
212 default false when pump_ctrl_repaired2
213 default pump_ctrl_fault2$ init false
214 | pump_ctrl_fault3 := true when pump_ctrl_fault_detected3
215 default false when pump_ctrl_repaired3
216 default pump_ctrl_fault3$ init false
217 | pump_ctrl_fault4 := true when pump_ctrl_fault_detected4
218 default false when pump_ctrl_repaired4
219 default pump_ctrl_fault4$ init false
220
221 % pump unit faults 1) non -responsiveness 2) spontaneous change %
222 | pump_ctrl_fault_detected1 := true when ( (( open_pump1$ init false)
and not(pump_ctrl_state1))
223 or (( close_pump1$ init false) and pump_ctrl_state1) )
224 default true when ( (open_pump1$ init false or close_pump1$ init
false)
225 and (pump_ctrl_state1 = pump_ctrl_state1$ init false) )
226 default false
227 | pump_ctrl_fault_detected2 := true when ( (( open_pump2$ init false)
and not(pump_ctrl_state2))
228 or (( close_pump2$ init false) and pump_ctrl_state2) )
229 default true when ( (open_pump2$ init false or close_pump2$ init
false)
230 and (pump_ctrl_state2 = pump_ctrl_state2$ init false) )
231 default false
232 | pump_ctrl_fault_detected3 := true when ( (( open_pump3$ init false)
and not(pump_ctrl_state3))
233 or (( close_pump3$ init false) and pump_ctrl_state3) )
234 default true when ( (open_pump3$ init false or close_pump3$ init
false)
235 and (pump_ctrl_state3 = pump_ctrl_state3$ init false) )
236 default false
237 | pump_ctrl_fault_detected4 := true when ( (( open_pump4$ init false)
and not(pump_ctrl_state4))
238 or (( close_pump4$ init false) and pump_ctrl_state4) )
239 default true when ( (open_pump4$ init false or close_pump4$ init
false)
240 and (pump_ctrl_state4 = pump_ctrl_state4$ init false) )
241 default false
242
243 | pump_fault_detected1 := false when ( pump_ctrl_fault1 )
244 default true when ( (( open_pump1$ init false) and not(pump_state1)
)
245 or (( close_pump1$ init false) and pump_state1) )
246 default false
247 | pump_fault_detected2 := false when ( pump_ctrl_fault2 )
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248 default true when ( (( open_pump2$ init false) and not(pump_state2)
)
249 or (( close_pump2$ init false) and pump_state2) )
250 default false
251 | pump_fault_detected3 := false when ( pump_ctrl_fault3 )
252 default true when ( (( open_pump3$ init false) and not(pump_state3)
)
253 or (( close_pump3$ init false) and pump_state3) )
254 default false
255 | pump_fault_detected4 := false when ( pump_ctrl_fault4 )
256 default true when ( (( open_pump4$ init false) and not(pump_state4)
)
257 or (( close_pump4$ init false) and pump_state4) )
258 default false
259
260 % measure faults 1) known system capacity exceed %
261 % 2) delta change inconsistent with physical system %
262 | level_fault_detected := true when ( (level < 0) or (level > C)
263 or (level_delta$ init 0) > 4 ) default false
264 | level_delta := (level - (level$ init 110)) when (level > (level$
init 110)) %Must provide init value%




268 | steam_fault_detected := true when ( (steam$ init 0 < 0) or (steam$
init 0 > C)
269 or (steam_delta$ init 0) > 4 ) default false
270 | steam_delta := (steam - (steam$ init 0)) when (steam > (steam$
init 0)) %Must provide init value%




275 % water level measuring unit fault %
276 | water_level_measuring_unit_fault := true when
level_fault_detected
277 default false when level_repaired
278 default water_level_measuring_unit_fault$ init false
279
280 % steam level measuring unit fault %
281 | steam_level_measuring_unit_fault := true when
steam_fault_detected
282 default false when steam_repaired
283 default steam_level_measuring_unit_fault$ init false
284
285 % transmission fault: No response %
286 | transmission_fault := true when ( (( pump_fault_detected1$ init
false) and (not pump_fault_ack1))
287 or (( pump_fault_detected2$ init false) and (not pump_fault_ack2))
288 or (( pump_fault_detected3$ init false) and (not pump_fault_ack3))
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289 or (( pump_fault_detected4$ init false) and (not pump_fault_ack4))
290 or (( pump_ctrl_fault_detected1$ init false) and (not
pump_ctrl_fault_ack1))
291 or (( pump_ctrl_fault_detected2$ init false) and (not
pump_ctrl_fault_ack2))
292 or (( pump_ctrl_fault_detected3$ init false) and (not
pump_ctrl_fault_ack3))
293 or (( pump_ctrl_fault_detected4$ init false) and (not
pump_ctrl_fault_ack4))
294 or (( level_fault_detected$ init false) and (not level_fault_ack))
295 or (( steam_fault_detected$ init false) and (not
steam_outcome_fault_ack))
296 % transmission fault: Unsolicited response %
297 or ((not pump_fault1) and pump_fault_ack1)
298 or ((not pump_fault2) and pump_fault_ack2)
299 or ((not pump_fault3) and pump_fault_ack3)
300 or ((not pump_fault4) and pump_fault_ack4)
301 or ((not pump_ctrl_fault1) and pump_ctrl_fault_ack1)
302 or ((not pump_ctrl_fault2) and pump_ctrl_fault_ack2)
303 or ((not pump_ctrl_fault3) and pump_ctrl_fault_ack3)
304 or ((not pump_ctrl_fault4) and pump_ctrl_fault_ack4)
305 or ((not water_level_measuring_unit_fault) and level_fault_ack)




309 % track message information %
310 | steam_boiler_waiting_received := true when steam_boiler_waiting
311 default steam_boiler_waiting_received$ init false
312
313 | physical_units_ready_received := true when physical_units_ready




318 % physical constants %
319 constant integer C = 150; % maximal boiler capacity %
320 constant integer M1 = 20; % minimal limit %
321 constant integer M2 = 130; % maximal limit %
322 constant integer N1 = 60; % minimal normal %
323 constant integer N2 = 90; % maximal normal %
324
325 % program states %
326 constant integer INIT_MODE = 1;
327 constant integer NORMAL_MODE = 2;
328 constant integer DEGRADED_MODE = 3;
329 constant integer RESCUE_MODE = 4;
330 constant integer EMERGENCY_MODE = 5;
331
332 % local variables %
333 % system faults %
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334 boolean pump_fault1 , pump_fault2 ,
335 pump_fault3 , pump_fault4 ,
336 pump_ctrl_fault1 , pump_ctrl_fault2 ,




341 % transmission data %
342 steam_boiler_waiting_received init false ,
343 physical_units_ready_received init false;
344
345 % physical data %
346 integer level_delta init 0,
347 steam_delta init 0,
348 rescue_estimate_high init 0,
349 rescue_estimate_low init 0,
350 pmp1 , pmp2 , pmp3 , pmp4 ,
351 pump_count init 0,
352 pmpflt1 , pmpflt2 , pmpflt3 , pmpflt4 ,
353 pump_fault_count init 0;
354
355 end; % steamBoiler %
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